nokia – Tech.pinions

Microsoft’s Business Model Ménage à Trois

Ben Thompson of Stratechery wrote yet another brilliant article on Microsoft entitled: “It’s Time To Split Up Microsoft“. Highly recommended reading. I agree with Thompson in part, and I disagree with him in part. Let’s start with the parts where we agree.

1.0 Balmer

1.1 Innovation Inflation

The following is from Steve Ballmer’s 2004 memo “Our Path Forward:”

“The key to our growth is innovation. Microsoft was built on innovation, has thrived on innovation, and its future depends on innovation. We are filing for over 2,000 patents a year for new technologies, and we see that number increasing. We lead in innovation in most areas where we compete, and where we do lag – like search and online music distribution – rest assured that the race to innovate has just begun and we will pull ahead. Our innovation pipeline is strong, and these innovations will lead to revenue growth from market expansion, share growth, new scenarios, value-add through services (alone and in partnership with network operators), and using software to open up new areas.” ~ Steve Ballmer, via Ben Thompson’s Article

Hmm. If you have to use the word innovation 7 times in the span of a mere 115 words, you probably don’t know what the word means. Dogs chase cars, but that doesn’t mean they know how to drive. And Microsoft can chase innovation all it wants, but that doesn’t mean they know how to innovate.

I suspect what Ballmer was actually talking about in his memo was iteration, not innovation. Iteration is highly valuable too, but it has nothing at all to do with innovation.

Iteration is incremental improvements in an existing product or service.

Innovation is unique, yes. And it is uniquely useful, yes. But its key characteristic is that it meets unanticipated, unexpected, or unarticulated needs.

The trouble with innovation is that truly innovative ideas often look like bad ideas at the time. That’s why they are innovative — until now, nobody ever figured out that they were good ideas. ~ Ben Horiwitz

Iteration is preserving the status quo by enhancing it. Innovation is radical. It’s revolutionary. It’s subversive. It doesn’t build upon the old market, it shatters the status quo and creates a new market to build upon.

Truth be told, Ballmer wanted nothing at all to do with innovation. When Ballmer wrote his memo in 2004, Microsoft was the undisputed king of the tech world. Innovation is a change agent and last thing Ballmer wanted was to change things. On the contrary, Ballmer wanted things to stay exactly the way they were.

1.2 Focus

“Ballmer then listed (in his memo) 10 different areas of “focus”, the vast majority of which were themselves so broad as to be meaningless.” ~ Ben Thompson

I love the point Ben Thompson is making here. Focusing on ten things is the same as focusing on nothing. Yet Microsoft’s “focus” problem went even deeper than this. In a perverse way, Microsoft WAS very focused. Only they were focused on the wrong thing: their competitors. Jeff Bezos nicely sums up the problem with that approach:

If you’re competitor-focused, you have to wait until there is a competitor doing something. Being customer-focused allows you to be more pioneering. ~ Jeff Bezos

Does this sound like the Microsoft we all know and love? The Zune was a response to the iPod. Windows Phone 7 was a response to the iPhone. Surface was a response to the iPad. And all of those responses came to market late, late, late.

During Ballmer’s reign, Microsoft didn’t so much have a strategy as they had an anti-strategy. (See my article: Microsoft Is The Very Antithesis Of Strategy.) They waited for their competitors to act and then they reacted. They reacted far too slow and far too late. Even worse, they made bad choices, the worst of which was the choice to make their own hardware. The Zune flopped, the purchase of Nokia is a boondoggle and the Surface is a financial anchor weighing Microsoft down. Microsoft needs hardware like a fish needs a net.

1.3 Microsoft’s High-Water Mark

Ben Thompson:

“Ballmer and Microsoft simply could not break free of their Windows-first mindset, and while it would be another 3 years before the iPhone arrived, it was this memo and what it represented that marked the beginning of Microsoft’s decline.”

A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses; it is an idea that possesses the mind. ~ Robert Oxton Bolt

[pullquote]Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you are a mile away from them and you have their shoes. ~ Dave Barry[/pullquote]

This is the point in my article where I’m supposed to trash Steve Ballmer for being shortsighted. But, truth be told, I have a lot of sympathy for him. The only thing harder than saving a dying company is saving one at the top of its game.

A company near death HAS to focus.

The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. ~ Henry Kissinger

A company near death HAS to be innovative.

Mortal danger is an effective antidote for fixed ideas. ~ Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

[pullquote]Until you walk a mile in another man’s moccasins you can’t imagine the smell. ~ Robert Byrne[/pullquote]

Microsoft’s problem was they didn’t have a problem. Without the impetus of bankruptcy or any credible threat, they had little reason to change. In fact, they had NO reason to change and EVERY reason to stay the same. However, as Carrie Fisher put it, “There is no point at which you can say: ‘Well, I’m successful now. I might as well take a nap.'”

If everything’s under control, you are going too slow. ~ Mario Andretti

If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously overlooked something. ~ Steven Wright

In this business, by the time you realize you’re in trouble, it’s too late to save yourself. Unless you’re running scared all the time, you’re gone. ~ Bill Gates

1.4 Vertical Or Horizontal — Pick One, Not Both

Ben Thompson:

“(T)ech companies ought to be either vertically/platform focused, with software and services that differentiate hardware (like Apple), or horizontally/service focused, with the goal of offering superior software and services on all devices (like Google and Facebook). To try and do both, as Ballmer explicitly did with his “Devices and Services” strategy, is to do neither well: differentiating your devices by definition means offering an inferior service on other platforms; offering superior services everywhere means commoditizing your own devices. “Devices and Services” was nonsense.”

I LOVE this.

Microsoft used to have a clear and simple business model. They made the operating system, they licensed the operating system to hardware manufacturers. The end.

Microsoft didn’t compete with their hardware manufacturers by selling hardware. They didn’t compete with their developers by selling software. ((There is one HUGE exception to this rule and that is Microsoft Office. Ben Thompson does a great job of explaining why this conflict worked and worked well — for a while — so I refer you to his article, “It’s Time To Split Up Microsoft“. I couldn’t have said it half as well.)) They competed with other operating systems and boy, did they ever compete. During the eighties, Microsoft squashed challenger after challenger and when the dust from the PC wars settled, the only rival operating system left standing was the Mac — and even it was on its metaphorical knees. ((STEVE WILDSTROM: “From the day that the IBM PC overtook the Apple ][, Microsoft software dominated the market. The Macintosh, introduced in 1984, never challenged MS-DOS or Windows for dominance.”
—
“Other rivals to Microsoft did indeed lose: Novell’s DR-DOS and IBM’s OS/2 operating systems disappeared, along with Netware, Novell’s once-dominant office networking system.”))

Today, of course, it’s a very different story. Microsoft still licenses its operating system to hardware manufacturers. But it also directly competes with those same hardware manufacturers by selling hardware of its own. And while Microsoft is currently making serious inroads into the business of providing internet services that run across all platforms, they continue to directly compete with the very same platforms that they are attempting to sell their services to.

No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. ~ New Testament, Matthew 6:24

It’s really, really tough to make a great product if you have to serve two masters. ~ Phil Libin, Evernote CEO

Two masters? Microsoft is trying to simultaneously serve THREE masters. Yikes!

Microsoft fits the definition of a business model ménage à trois: There are three of ’em, and they’re all trying to screw one another.

2.0 Nadella

2.1 Better Than Ballmer

Ben Thompson:

“To understand why so many serious Microsoft observers were encouraged by Satya Nadella’s week-ago memo, “Bold Ambition and Our Core,” it’s useful to go back 10 years and read Steve Ballmer’s 2004 memo Our Path Forward.”

Hmm. Apparently “serious” Microsoft observers are more willing to overlook the serious problems with Nadella’s memo just because it’s better than Ballmer’s memo, while less serious Microsoft observers, like me, take those serious shortcomings more seriously.

A…speech should be like a lady’s dress—long enough to cover the subject and short enough to be interesting. ~ R. A. “RAB” Butler

[pullquote]He can compress the most words into the smallest idea of any man I ever met. ~ Abraham Lincoln[/pullquote]

Let’s set aside the fact that reading Nadella’s memo was like gargling with broken glass ((With apologies to Hugh Leonard)).

And let’s set aside the fact that what Nadella’s memo lacked in depth it made up for in length. ((With apologies to Chares de Montesquieu))

And let’s agree Nadella’s memo is better than Ballmer’s memo…so long as we also agree that still isn’t saying very much.

So what? At best that’s damning with faint praise. ((Damning with faint praise is an English idiom for words that effectively condemn by seeming to offer praise which is too moderate or marginal to be considered praise at all. In other words, this phrase identifies the act of expressing a compliment so feeble it amounts to no compliment at all, or even implies a kind of condemnation.)) Exactly what was it Nadella said in his memo that “serious” Microsoft observers could possibly have found even remotely encouraging?

2.2 Going Sideways

Ben Thompson:

More recently, we have described ourselves as a “devices and services” company. While the devices and services description was helpful in starting our transformation, we now need to hone in on our unique strategy. ~ Satya Nadella

What a great start! (Well, technically, it’s not really a “start” since we’re already 558 words into Nadella’s memo. But let’s set that aside, for now.) This is great stuff. Nadella has tactfully repudiated his predecessor’s strategy without actually saying it in so many words. Further, he’s promising to hone in on Microsoft’s unique strategy. I’m all agog. Can’t wait to hear what’s coming next!

“At our core, Microsoft is the productivity and platform company for the mobile-first and cloud-first world. We will reinvent productivity to empower every person and every organization on the planet to do more and achieve more.” ~ Satya Nadella

DISAPPOINTED!

Seriously? That’s Nadella’s idea of honing in on Microsoft’s unique strategy? Prepare thyself for a MASSIVE rant.

Microsoft is a “platform” company? That could mean a lot of things. Or anything. Or nothing. Microsoft is a “productivity” company? Whoop-de-doo. Who isn’t? Microsoft is “mobile-first and cloud-first?” Newsflash: They can’t both be “first.” Microsoft will “reinvent productivity?” No, it won’t. You can’t reinvent productivity anymore than you can manufacture new antiques. Microsoft will “empower….” Ugh. Enough said.

We will…empower every organization on the planet to do more and achieve more. ~ Satya Nadella

Ben Thompson seems to put particular stock in this phrase. I’ll discuss its “horizontal” business model implications below. However, in terms of defining Microsoft’s mission, it’s a complete dud. Microsoft is going to empower people to “do more and achieve more?” Wow, thanks for narrowing it down. Helping people “do more and achieve more” is about as non-specific, over-generalized, feel-good-but-means-nothing, applies-to-practically-every-company-that-ever-existed as it gets. That’s not honing-in, that’s zoning-out.

2.3 Teasing Out A Tortured Message

Ben Thompson:

[Microsoft’s productivity apps] will be built for other ecosystems so as people move from device to device, so will their content and the richness of their services – it’s one way we keep people, not devices, at the center.” ~ Satya Nadella

This is exactly right. Nadella is making a choice here: productivity as a single unifying principle and, by extension, services based on people, not differentiation based on devices. Moreover, it’s a far more difficult and brave choice – obvious though it may be – than outside observers could likely understand. It was only a little over a year ago Ballmer declared, “Nothing is more important at Microsoft than Windows.”

Last week, Nadella said “No.” ~ Ben Thompson

Let’s break that analysis down.

“(I)t’s a far more difficult and brave choice – obvious though it may be – than outside observers could likely understand.”

First, I concede I am an “outside observer.” However, I’m not willing to cede the interpretation of Nadella’s words solely to Microsoft insiders.

“Nadella is making a choice here: productivity as a single unifying principle…”

Second, I’m totally not buying this. “Productivity” is far too broad a term to constitute a “single unifying principle.” And as for it being a “choice,” what exactly is Nadella choosing between: Productive and non-productive?

“(S)ervices based on people, not differentiation based on devices.”

Third, what I think you are saying is you think Nadella is saying Microsoft is moving toward services, and away from devices. (If that’s what Nadella actually meant to say, it would have been nice if he had actually said it.) Further, I think you are saying you think Nadella is saying Windows is no longer Microsoft’s be all and end all. And — despite the tortured path used to get us there — I kinda agree with that interpretation. Unfortunately, Nadella’s actions — and Ben Thompson’s own analysis — disagree.

2.4 Two Problems

How do I know Ben Thompson’s analysis doesn’t support the suggestion Microsoft is moving away from devices and toward services? Because he says so in his article when he discusses Windows, here ((BEN THOMPSON: “For all the talk of moving beyond Windows (and Windows Phone), I am deeply skeptical Microsoft can truly pursue its potential as a software and services company as long as Windows is around.”)) and when he discusses Nokia, here ((BEN THOMPSON: “The effects of (the Nokia) deal – and understanding why it was made – have convinced me that Microsoft cannot truly reach its potential as a services company as long as Windows and the entire devices business is in tow.”)) and here ((BEN THOMPSON: “When Nadella took over earlier this year Microsoft had not only missed the mobile boat, he was now saddled with a $7.2 billion dollar anchor and 34,000 new employees. That’s the thing about last week’s layoffs: even after shedding 18,000 employees Microsoft will still be about 16% bigger than they were before the acquisition, and still tightly bound to a devices group that is working at diametrically opposed goals from the software and services businesses that are Microsoft’s future.”)) and when he discusses devices, here. ((BEN THOMPSON: “I’m bothered by the phrase “We have a big opportunity.” For (COO Kevin) Turner, the opportunity is in growing that 14%. As quoted by Gregg Keizer: We want to go from 14% to 18%, from 18% to 25%, from 25% to 30%. That’s the beauty of this model … [the opportunity] is much bigger than anything we’ve had in the past.
—
Turner is still talking about devices, and it’s really too bad.”))

And how do I know Satya Nadella isn’t moving Microsoft from devices and to services? Because his actions speak far louder — and far clearer — than do his words.

We know what a person thinks not when he tells us what he thinks, but by his actions. ~ Isaac Bashevis Singer

I’ll agree Satya Nadella has said “yes” to services. But what has he said “no” to? The Windows operating system licensing business model and the hardware business model (Nokia phones and Surface Hybrid) and the services business model all continue to co-compete, one with the other. Nadella is doing what Ballmer always did. When faced with a choice, he has chosen not to choose. When faced with a decision between business models, he has decided not to decide.

Action expresses priorities. ~ Gandhi

Yes, action expresses priorities. And inaction obscures them.

It’s true services may gain primacy at Microsoft. However, so long as three business models remain — like nesting dolls, one within the other — Microsoft’s internal conflicts and external turmoil will continue, unabated.

Deciding what not to do is as important as deciding what to do. That’s true for companies, and it’s true for products. ~ Steve Jobs

Conclusion

Okay, let’s agree Nadella isn’t the best communicator in the world. That’s too bad because words can make your heart soar…or they can make your head sore. ((Tip of the hat to Dr. Mardy and his aphorisms.)) However, words aren’t everything. When the Nokia phone line is cut; when the Surface hybrid is cut; then we won’t have to read Nadella’s memos to know where Microsoft is headed. Nadella’s actions will speak far louder than any words could.

A man is judged by his deeds, not by his words. ~ Russian Proverb

Until that day, Microsoft should be careful that they don’t become a joke:

A Jewish woman had two chickens. One got sick, so the woman made chicken soup out of the other one to help the sick one get well. ~ Henny Youngman

Microsoft is in danger of making chicken soup out of their healthy business divisions in order to sustain their ailing businesses. If they’re not very, very careful, they’ll end up with a bunch of dead chickens and egg all over their face.

India And The Future Of The Smartphone Wars

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A Suspicious Angle to Microsoft’s Acquisition of Nokia

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Microsoft and Nokia: A Strategic Blunder

There’s an old military adage, “Reinforce success; never reinforce failure.” By purchasing Nokia’s device business for about $5 billion, Microsoft has just reinforced failure in a big way. It has been three years since Microsoft attempted to reboot its mobile business with Windows Phone 7, two and a half years since the company struck a broad partnership with Nokia, and a year since the introduction of Windows Phone 8 and the Surface tablet. Microsoft has next to nothing to show for any of these efforts.

Microsoft can easily afford the purchase price; it has the money lying around under the cushions of various couches around the world. The issue is one of strategic focus. At a time when Microsoft should be turning its attention to its successful core businesses to build for the future, it is redoubling its efforts in an area where it is struggling, at best.

At a time when it should be thinking about the strategic direction of a new CEO, Steve Ballmer in his remaining months and his now probable successor, Nokia CEO Stephen Elop, who will become a Microsoft executive vice president, will instead be devoting a lot of time and effort to integrating Nokia. The money-losing device business had about $15 billion in revenues last year, which would make it Microsoft’s fourth largest division (see chart.) But its 32,000 employees will increase Microsoft’s worldwide employment by nearly a third. A Finnish hardware unit and Microsoft, the quintessential software company have cultures that likely will resist easy integration.

The challenges for Nokiasoft are overwhelming. I thought for a long time that there was room for a third platform in mobile phones and that Windows Phone might well be it. But Microsoft, even with the Nokia partnership, has yet to rise above minuscule market share in the U.S. or worldwide. The implosion of BlackBerry was the best opportunity for Microsoft to grab share, but it has failed to do so. Microsoft must struggle to carve out a niche in what has become an iOS-Android world, or maybe an Apple-Google-Samsung world if Samsung and Google part company.

Missing apps. Furthermore, Windows Phone, now with more Nokia, still has the same old problem: The lack of an adequate app ecosystem. In software, Microsoft doesn’t get anything from Nokia that Windows phone didn’t already have (Nokia’s strongest mobile software asset, its maps business, is not part of the deal.) After three years, Windows Phone still lacks such table stakes apps as native YouTube and Instagram clients. Maybe a Herculean effort by Microsoft management could change this, but such an effort means other, probably more important things, are not going to be done.

The outlook in tablets is even bleaker. Windows RT, the version developed specifically for tablets, is a resounding flop and Windows 8 on tablets hasn’t faired much better. Nokia reportedly has a Windows RT tablet ready to launch this fall; unless it is a lot better than the Surface or the Surface’s planned successor, it would just split a tiny market.

The iPhone has turned mobile phones, even business phones, into an overwhelmingly consumer business. This means the Nokia acquisition has plunged Microsoft far deeper into an area it really should be abandoning, Microsoft simply is not very good as a consumer company. And it is hard to see what Nokia, headed by a man whose greatest managerial success came as head of the Microsoft Business division, brings.

The Xbox problem. Xbox is Microsoft’s one consumer bright spot, but the chart above shows its fundamental weakness. Even putting aside the enormous sunk cost of Xbox and the fumbled launch of the Xbox One, the Entertainment & Devices segment is too small, especially in profit share, to make much of a difference. With little prospect for explosive growth in the game console-cum-set top box market, Xbox is not going to save Microsoft.

With whatever energy Microsoft management has left after coping the the challenges of the Nokia acquisition, the company should focus on what it does well, and that is to sell business software. That is a market that has been changing, but here Microsoft has been adapting, converting its traditional sale of permanent software licenses into software-as-a-service and platform-as-a-service offering.

Windows sales will shrink with the PC market, but they aren’t going away and will remain highly profitable; a 50% operating margin for the Windows division in a crummy year is impressive. The urgent need is for Microsoft to develop a replacement for Windows 7 that businesses might want to buy–something with the under-the-hood improvements of Windows 8 but without either of its unloved user interfaces.

Reinforce success. The business software operations also deserve reinforcement. The big part of the tech commentariat that knows little or nothing about business software consistently underestimates the importance and staying power of Office (I agree that Office is finished in consumer markets, but that was never its real business anyway.) Back-office tools such as Exchange, SharePoint, and SQL Server remain mighty money-makers and the Microsoft Dynamics suite of resource planning, customer relationship management, and accounting tools is growing nicely.

Web services, particularly those that serve business rather than those that are directly consumer-facing, are another area of strength. While behind Google in many areas, Microsoft is well ahead of Apple, which often seems as clueless about Web services as it is savvy about devices. Azure, another service little-known to those who do not follow enterprise software, has made impressive gains the the platform-as-a-service business, though Microsoft should stop hurting itself by branding the product as Windows Azure. Windows has had a great run as a brand, but it is time to move on.

In the constantly mutating tech world, Microsoft cannot afford for its top management to take its eyes off these successful operations. But I fear that it will be hard to give these operations, which I think represent Microsoft’s best chances for future success, the attention they deserve while management is deeply distracted by the enormous challenges of Nokia. The $7 billion investment (including a patent licensing deal) was not a huge amount of money, but its ultimate cost to Microsoft could be a lot higher.

Together At Last

News just broke that Microsoft has acquired Nokia’s handset and devices division. Here is the intro from the press release:

Microsoft to acquire Nokia Devices & Services, accelerating the Windows ecosystem

Nokia and Microsoft have always dreamed big – we dreamed of putting a computer on every desk, and a mobile phone in every pocket, and we’ve come a long way toward realizing those dreams.

Today marks a moment of reinvention.

I don’t know if this comes as a shocker to many since speculation of this acquisition has been in the works for some time.

We will have a number of more in-depth analysis of this acquisition and it’s impact to the industry in the days to come for our Tech.pinions Insiders. But for now I encourage you to read Tim Bajarin’s prediction of this even from 2011. His analysis of why Microsoft would buy Nokia still stands today as the context that makes sense of this acquisition.

Vertical is the trend. Any company who owns hardware, software, and services bound together as a complete ecosystem presents themselves as a formidable competitor positioned for the long haul. Doesn’t mean all will be successful with this recipe but many will try none-the-less.

Why Microsoft Will Buy Nokia.

Verizon, Nokia and the Quest for Differentiation

My first portable cellphone was the size of a brick and weighed almost 2 pounds. And it was dumb. All it did was make calls. By the mid 1990’s Verizon started creating what we now call a feature phone and created its own mini OS, which allowed Verizon to create dedicated apps of their own as well as give third party software developers the tools to also create apps for these phones. This was important since it gave Verizon a controlled eco-system of hardware and software that allowed it to significantly differentiate their cell phones over the competitors.

Of course, the apps they had back then were primitive compared to today’s smart phone applications but they did offer their customer’s games, better contact information and simple calendars, etc. But this was a pioneering move in cell phones and helped Verizon grow this business exponentially. However, in this mode, Verizon had complete control of their eco-system destiny and that made it difficult for third party software vendors to break into Verizon’s apps world in any meaningful way.

The new era of smartphones wrestled control of Verizon’s closed ecosystem away from them and other competitors doing similar things since these phones had an open OS and more importantly, an open approach to creating and selling apps directly to the customer. Some think that Apple’s ecosystem is closed but it really is a pretty open program in that third party software developers can and do create a plethora of iOS apps and Apple freely pays them directly for these apps when consumers buy them. Yes, Apple does veto some apps mostly for inappropriate content, but theirs is a very open approach compared to what Verizon had back in the heyday of feature phones.

One of the big problems with an open approach, whether it is with the Android OS or the Windows OS, is that both of these operating systems go to the vendors with identical user interfaces, thus creating what we like to call a sea of sameness. That means that an Android phone or a Windows Mobile OS phone all look the same since they use the same user interface. At the hardware level the handset vendor can try to innovate, but in most cases the OS GUI is untouched. This is especially true with Windows Mobile phones, although companies like HTC, Amazon and a few others have added their own UI layer on top of Android’s GUI to try and distinguish themselves from the competition.

Not to be undone by this turn of events, Verizon is working hard with some of their handset partners to make their phones more unique and add more value to the users. A good example is the way they have worked with Nokia on the new Lumia 822. Verizon went to Nokia and asked them specifically to do a special version of the Lumia that could be sold for $149 and had features only available on this phone.

Nokia worked hard with Verizon to accommodate this request and has added three key features that help this low cost smartphone stand out. The first is something called Nokia Drive. This is a turn-by-turn voice navigation service that uses their stellar Navteq maps to deliver a rich navigation solution to Lumia 822 owners. It will work in 89 countries and while in beta now, it will be released officially soon. This service also has something called My Commute that, over time, learns the directions to your office or workplace or any other heavily trafficked route and automatically gives directions to these places with its voice navigation feature as needed.

The second special thing Nokia brings to Verizon with this phone that is not available to others is something they call City Lens. This is an augmented reality application that works with the mapping program that overlays specific information about a place, restaurant or landmark to give users a richer mapping experience. Verizon sources say that this is first step in their augmented reality software and will make it even better over time to give users all types of data or information about locations they are visiting.

And the third thing that is specifically for the Lumia 822 is a new Nokia streaming music service called Nokia Music. It is subscription free and has 16 million tracks or 10 times more tracks then Pandora. Also no account is needed and works right out of the box. You can listen up to 12 hours of music free. You can also just tap and scroll in something called the gig finder, which seeks out the gigs or details of a your favorite band’s concerts schedule and locations.

I have been testing the Nokia Lumia 822 for a while now and am pretty impressed how much is packed into a $149.00 smart phone. The core of the OS is Windows Phone 8 with all of its new features such as live tiles and the special protected area for family’s and kids. But these new special features from Nokia add a richer dimension that gives customers a great experience that comes close to equaling what is available on more expensive smartphones.

What Verizon is doing with Nokia is significant. In a world of smartphones where the OS and UI are identical, doing things that help differentiate the phones and services over the networks will be an important key for success.

MWC 2012: Clear Android Differentiation and Other Trends

I suspect that each MWC will be better than the last. This show, I believe, is quickly becoming the leading industry conference for mobile smart device technologies. Therefore, Mobile World Congress will be one of the shows were we can expect to dig into the trends of our mobile computing tomorrow. On that point, this year a few things stand out.

Android Differentiation
Bloggers, journalists, some pundits, etc, mostly seem to believe the world would be a better place if Google’s OEM partners simply did not change Android and just shipped a stock OS the likes of the Nexus line of devices. Unfortunately in that reality hardware companies go out of business. Therefore differentiation is key if pure hardware players hope to stay in business.

Related Column: Dear Industry Dare to Differentiate

After seeing many of the Android device announcements from the leaders like Samsung and HTC, it is clear they are fully marching down the path of strategically differentiating from the pack. This I believe is a good thing all together.

Samsung for example is taking a stab with their Galaxy Note line of products at differentiating their device experience by pairing it with a companion pen experience. HTC did something similar with the Flyer but has seemed to have abandoned that path for now. For Samsung however, including the pen as an accessory (which is where it belongs) has opened the door to bundling exclusive and proprietary software in order to enhance the pen experience. Samsung is shipping with the Galaxy Note Phone (I refuse to support the Phablet term), and the Galaxy Note 10.1 tablet, Adobe’s touch suite of products like Photoshop and Ideas. Samsung is also including their own S Note application for note taking and other useful pen experiences. Samsung is wisely using this strategy as a key differentiator and if you watch any screen media you will see their marketing is fully committed to this direction.

HTC has also been going down this path and has now furthered their strategy even more with the new Sense 4.0 UI.

Beyond Samsung, pen accessories at large seem to be a trend around Android tablets. LG announced their Optimus VU with a pen accessory and I expect pen accessories to continue to be used as a differentiator for the time being.

It is clear at this point there will be no stock Android prioritized devices by the OEMs, thus I question the market at all for Nexus devices. Throw on top of that the fact that the stock Android devices running the latest release take over a year to roll out in any large fashion. John Gruber makes a great observation:

Best to think of today’s Ice Cream Sandwich as a developer preview of next year’s mass market Android phones.

Focus on Device Family Brands
The other trend I am noticing, which is also a positive sign, is that HTC and Samsung for example are focusing more on family lines of devices. Peter Chou of HTC during their press conference announced that HTC intends to streamline their roadmap and focus HTC innovations. HTC kicked this off by releasing a new family line of devices called the One “series.” Their flagship product is the HTC One X which sports the latest Tegra 3 chipset from NVIDIA.

Samsung also is heading this direction with the Galaxy S series, Tab family and now with the Galaxy Note. Motorola also hopefully continues this direction with the Razr family. And Nokia as well with their Lumia line of devices. This direction is needed within the industry in order to stop the absurd device naming syndrome that has plagued many OEMs. When you have dozens of devices in channel all with different names and marketing material blitzing consumers with dozens of device names etc, the landscape can look incredibly confusing.

By focusing on a family line of devices, OEMs can differentiation and then position those differentiating features within a family line of devices for their appropriate target audience.

All in all, I am seeing some positive trends coming out of MWC 2012 that encourages me about the state of healthy competition within the mobile smart devices landscape.

What Intel Must Demonstrate in Smartphones (and soon)

Intel made a big splash at CES 2012 with the announcement that Motorola and Lenovo committed to Intel’s Medfield smartphone solution. This came on the heels of a disappointing break-up between Intel and Nokia as well as a lack of previous traction with LG. While Intel has come farther than they have ever come before with one of their X86 SOCs, they still have a long way to go to claim smartphone victory. Of course Intel knows this and is working diligently and sparing no expense. The biggest challenge Intel faces is attacking a market where the incumbent, ARM ecosystem partners Qualcomm, NVIDIA, and Texas Instruments have almost 100% market share. To start gaining share in smartphones, Intel must demonstrate many things in the near future.

More Design Wins with Key Players

The Motorola announcement was impressive in that Moto has a respected name in smartphones, but they won’t carry Intel that far alone. Lenovo is an even smaller player and while very successful in PCs, hasn’t been able to secure a lot of smartphone market share even in their home country, China. Intel knows they need a few more partners to start chipping away at market share and I expect them to announce at least one at this year’s Mobile World Congress.

One of the challenges is that many of the top players are already locked-in in one way or another, Intel has some negative history with, or has rapidly declining share. Apple already has their own A-Series SOC, Samsung has Exynos SOC, and Nokia rebuffed Intel last year and is clearly locked into ARM and Microsoft for the time being. RIM as a partner is a shaky proposition and HTC is an aggressive player but is recently dropping share. That leaves lower smartphone market share holders LG, Sony, Sharp, NEC and ZTE in the short term.

Longer term, I don’t expect Apple or Samsung to get out of the SOC business because they have been successful with their own strategies. I cannot see Nokia or Microsoft motivated to drive a change or provide dual support for X86 until Windows 9. RIM is in a free-fall with no bottom in sight. Intel is forced to take the long-term approach as they are with Lenovo by developing smaller smartphone players to become larger ones. ZTE certainly is a good long term prospect as is Huawei. If Intel can leverage their PC franchise with them I could see them being successful.

Relevant, Differentiated, and Demonstrable Usage Models

In fighting any incumbent, the new entrant must provide something well above and beyond what the incumbent offers to incent a change in behavior. I am assuming that Intel won’t lead in low price or lowest development cost, so they must offer handset makers or the carriers a way to make more money or get consumers to demand an Intel-based smartphone. Regardless of which variable Intel wants to push, they must devise relevant, differentiated and demonstrable usage models that ARM cannot.

By relevant I mean that it must be fixing a known pain point or creating a real “wow” feature consumers never asked for, but is so cool it cannot be passed up. One pain point example is battery life. Battery life is simply not good enough on smartphones when used many times daily. If this weren’t true, car chargers and battery backs wouldn’t be so popular. Wireless display is useful and cool but not differentiated in that Apple can enable this via AirPlay. Demonstrable means that it must be demonstrated at the store, an ad, or on-line on a web site. If something isn’t demonstrable then it may as well not exist.

I would like to see Intel invest heavily in modularity, or the ability to best turn the smartphone into a PC through wireless display and wireless input. Yes, this is dangerous short-term in that if Intel does a great job at it then they could eat into their PC processor franchise. But, this is the innovator’s dilemma, and a leader must sacrifice something today to get something tomorrow. I could envision an Intel-based emerging region smartphone that enables PC functionality. ARM cannot offer this well today but will be able to in the future with their A15 and beyond-based silicon. Intel should jump on the modularity opportunity while it lasts.

One other opportunity here is for Intel to leverage their end-to-end experience from the X86-based Intel smartphone to the X86-based data center. If Intel can demonstrate something incredible in the end-to-end experience with something like security or a super-fast virtualized desktop, this could be incredibly impactful. One thing that will be with us for at least another 5 years is bandwidth limitation.

Carrier Excitement

Outside of Apple, the carriers are the gatekeepers. Consumers must go through them to get the wireless plans, the phones, and most importantly, the wireless subsidy. Apple’s market entry strategy with AT&T on the iPhone was a strategic masterpiece in how to get into a market and change the rules over time. Apple drove so much consumer demand for iPhones that the carriers were begging Apple to carry the iPhone, the exact opposite of the previous decade.

Intel must get carriers excited in the new usage models, bring them a new stream of revenue they feel they are being cut out from, or lower their costs. Intel doesn’t bring them revenue from content side but could I can imagine Intel enabling telcos to get a piece of classic retailer’s PC action once “family plans” become a reality. While telco-distributed PCs weren’t a big success in the past, this was due primarily from the absence of family data plans. I can also imagine Intel helping telcos lower the costs of their massive data centers with Xeon-based servers. Finally, if Intel could shift traffic on the already oversold “wire” by shifting processing done in the cloud and onto their SOCs, this would be very good in a bandwidth-constrained environment.

Competitive Handset Power

At CES, Intel showed some very impressive battery life figures for Medfield handsets:

• 6 hour HD video playback

• 5 hours 3G browsing

• 45 hour audio playback

• 8 hour 3G talk time

• 14 day standby

This was measured on Intel’s own reference platform which is somewhat representative of how OEMs handsets will perform. What will be very telling will be how Medfield performs on a Tier 1 handset maker, Motorola when they launch in Q3 2012. There is no reason to think the Moto handset won’t get as impressive battery life figures, but Intel could gain even more credibility by releasing those figures as available.

When Will We Know When/If Intel’s Smartphone Effort is a Success?

Intel has slowly but surely made inroads into the smartphone market. Medfield is impressive but competing with and taking share from an incumbent with 99%+ market share is a daunting task. The easy answer to measure Intel progress is by market share alone but that’s lazy. I believe that Intel smartphone efforts should first be measured by handset carrier alliances, the number of handset wins, the handset quality and the new end usage models their SOCs and software can enable. As these efforts lead to potential share gain does it make sense to start measuring and scrutinizing share.

Do Nokia and Windows Phone Have Any Hope for 2012?

There were a number of priorities for me at this years CES. One of my top priorities was to better understand Nokia’s strategy for Windows Phone and the US Market. Secondarily to Nokia’s US strategy was Microsoft in general and whether Windows Phone can grow in market share in the US in 2012.

As I have written before, Nokia has again entered the conversation at large, but more importantly, they have become relevant in the US smart phone market. I have expressed my belief that they contain some fundamental strengths, like brand, quality design, and marketing smarts, to at least compete in the US.

For Nokia, this years CES bore two important and timely US events. The first was that their US presence was solidified when the US sales of their Lumia 710 officially became available at T-Mobile this week. The second was the announcement at this years CES of the Lumia 900 which will come to market on AT&T.

Both products are well designed and the Windows Phone experience is impressive. That being said, Nokia’s and Microsoft’s challenge is primarily convincing consumers that Windows Phone is an OS worth investing in.

I use that terminology because that is exactly what an OS platform is asking consumers to do. Not only invest but allow this most personal device to become a part of their life.

Currently, only a small fraction of consumers are convinced that they should buy into Windows Phone 7 and it will take quite a bit more convincing for most. Nokia and Windows Phone face stiff competition with the army of Android devices and the industry leader in Apple. If anything, Nokia and Windows Phone have a small window of opportunity to rise above what is the Android sea of sameness – but it is only a small window. This is because many more of Android’s core and loyal (on the surface) partners will continue to invest resources in Windows Phone over the next few years. If Microsoft and Nokia are successful the result should be that the market will contain not only a sea of Android devices but of Windows Phone devices as well.

This is why the battle will again turn to differentiation across the board on both the Android and Windows Phone platform. I have previously dared the industry to differentiate and this will need to be the focus going forward.

As I look at where we are right now, it appears that Nokia is faced with an unfortunate dilemma. Nokia now bears the difficult task of not only spending money to develop their brand in the US but to also help Microsoft convince consumers Windows Phone is the right platform for them.

Microsoft is unfortunately not building or investing in the Windows Phone consumer marketing as aggressively as they should on their own. So rather then be able to simply focus on their brand, Nokia must also invest in marketing Windows Phone. This will inevitably help Nokia but also their competitors in the long term.

All of this, however, presents Microsoft with what is the chance of a lifetime and it all relates to Windows 8. The importance of Windows 8 to Microsoft seems to be wildly shrugged off by many. But I believe that if Microsoft does not succeed in creating consumer demand with Windows 8, they will begin to loose OS market share even faster than they are right now.

Windows Phone’s success in 2012 can pave the way for Windows 8. If Microsoft can, at the very least, create some level of interest and ultimately generate demand for Windows Phone, it will almost certainly do the same for Windows 8. This is because once you have gotten used to the user experience of Windows Phone, it creates a seamless transition to the Windows 8 experience.

If Microsoft can generate some level of success for Windows Phone in 2012, it will build a needed level of momentum for Windows 8. Primarily because the Windows Phone and Windows 8 Metro UI are very similar. All of these steps are necessary for Microsoft to not only create demand for their OS platforms but to also create demand for their ecosystem. I have emphasized the importance of the ecosystem in past columns and Microsoft must leverage their assets to create loyal consumers.

So what is my conclusion for 2012? Simply put, and to use a sports analogy, it is a rebuilding year for Microsoft and Nokia. Both companies need to view 2012 as a “laying-a-foundation-for-the-future” year. I do expect Windows Phone and Nokia to grow in market share in the US but I am not sure if we can count on double digit growth. If both companies play their cards right in 2012, then 2013 will present them with the growth opportunities they both desire.

Past Columns Mentioned:
Why Nokia is Interesting
Dear Industry – Dare to Differentiate
Why It’s All About the Ecosystem

Has Nokia Raised the Bar Enough?

Yesterday in London at its big conference. Nokia’s CEO Stephen Elop announced its next generation phones, Lumia (Windows Phone 7.5 based) and Asha (S40 based), which we were told means “Hope” in Hindi. Although Asha is an interesting device for many emerging markets, it’s the Lumia that is most important to Nokia’s future and the announcement the market was anxiously awaiting. So while Nokia did introduce two new Windows Phone smartphones of nice design (the Lumia 800 for the premium market and a slightly less costly version the 710), and three Symbian devices meant for the market between feature phones and smart phones, overall the announcements at Nokia World disappointed on a number of accounts.

First, Nokia did not confirm when and what would go to North America – only that there would be a portfolio of devices released early next year (once LTE stabilizes they said). What does that say about the commitment from the carriers to Lumia? If you have a halo device (where Lumia is being positioned) and it’s not being sold in the largest market, what does that say about your market position?

Second, there was no mention of how Nokia would differentiate from other Windows Phone vendors, other than with a better camera, navigation application and music services. Not enough. Samsung makes a nice Windows Phone, as does HTC. Why would a consumer choose a Nokia device?

Third, the pricing was set at a premium pricing level (420 Euros, or about $599 US before subsidies). Nokia is competing against the market leaders at about the same pricing level. There is no advantage taken by Nokia in trying to get back into the marketplace at a reasonable price with a premium product. It’s roughly the same price as iPhone 4S after subsidies and this could be a tough sell.

Fourth, what about the enterprise? There was no mention of how they would help with management and security for corporate. customers other than pointing to Microsoft tools and capabilities. IT doesn’t need yet another device to work with when there is already so much diversity from BYOD. IT wants help and expects some advantage from key suppliers. Microsoft management tools for mobile are inferior and especially so when looking at a diverse environment. Where were the partnership announcements with MDM vendors that would have indicated the serious nature Nokia places on business?

Fifth, what about Windows 8? That is the future (Windows Phone 7.5 is a place holder until the next-gen devices come out in 12-18 months and bridge the PC, tablet and phone markets). This would have been a great opportunity to make a strategy statement at a high level at least, even if not a detailed statement. And it would have indicated an acknowledgement by Nokia of the importance it places in the partnership with Microsoft.

Finally, where was Microsoft’s endorsement? No one from Microsoft spoke during the keynote. No doubt Microsoft wants to keep some distance to not offend its other OEMs, but if this is such a close partnership, where is the “love”?

So I’m left with many questions after the announcements. How do the new devices fit into a diverse environment in an enterprise setting? Where are the enterprise tools to deploy, activate secure and manage them? What is the Nokia Value Add on top of plane Windows Phone? What did they do to enhance the Windows Phone platform beyond what Microsoft offers? Nokia seemed to show once again that they understand how to make appealing hardware, but fell short in service offerings that could differentiate them in the market, especially with the important business user.

Bottom Line: Nokia World was really Nokia’s coming out party. It was meant to show a revitalized company. They did offer a couple of new phone families (one Windows Phone, one Symbian). But they missed the opportunity to show what Nokia represents longer term, how it adds value to the Microsoft standard OS features, and what it will do to differentiate in the market from both other Windows Phone makers and the Android and iPhone market. Nokia a missed opportunity.

Why Nokia is Interesting

What if I was to tell you that the global handset war of the future will be between Apple and Nokia? On a global scale this may very well be the case as I am convinced now that, from a global perspective, Apple and Nokia think very similarly.

This of course does not mean that other handset OEM’s will not be competitive in these areas. However, from a brand and global handset strategy perspective, Apple and Nokia seem poised to compete head to head.

Nokia has never fully exited the realm of relevance. I follow the WW market for phones and am quite interested in what are the big picture global handset consumer trends. Because of that, Nokia and even RIM for that matter, still come up in conversations. However, I believe Nokia has a brighter future than RIM.

Nokia has maintained its relevance both in the terms of product offerings and brand very well on a global scale. Those of us who live, watch, and study the US market primarily, often forget that the world is bigger than the US. Nokia has a weak to non-existent brand in the US so it’s easy to count them out–although we shouldn’t.

There are a few key reasons why I think Nokia is interesting and I will be keeping a watchful eye on them as a global handset competitor. The first is their ability to manufacture handsets in massive quantities.

Nokia currently manufactures 1 million phones every day. Now, those are not all smart phones and mostly feature phones. However, what is key is Nokia’s ability to handle scale. This is one of the key things any global player will need to be able to manage and execute to meet the global handset demands of the future. Nokia can manufacture massive quantities of a single phone design and that is not easy to do.

Nokia has an extremely efficient process for designing and manufacturing handsets and this is one of the key reasons I think they are interesting and, other than Apple, can meet capacity of the future demands.

Again this is not to say other brands like HTC, Samsung, Moto and others will not be successful, only that they will ship more products in lower volume rather than massive volume of only a few designs.

The other element I think Nokia brings to the table is their roots in design innovation. Nokia has certainly had their share of design flops but generally speaking, they are at least creative and out-of-the-box when it comes to design.

The design of hardware is one of the central things factoring into the buying process of consumers. The ability to design an object of desire is very difficult and even companies who do it well don’t necessarily hit home runs each time. Nokia has a history of innovative design and because of that going forward I find them interesting.

On a slightly lesser scale than the last two points, Nokia is also interesting because of their partnership with Microsoft. This, I feel, was a wise choice of an OS partner but it will still bring challenges.

I am very optimistic about Windows Phone and in particular Nokia as a partner in this area for Microsoft. Nokia has a strong brand in many parts of the region and with the release of two Windows phones, the Lumia 800 and the Lumia 710, they have taken their first step to become relevant in the smart phone segment.

Although I am optimistic and will follow Nokia with a keen eye from here on out, there are still many questions that need to be answered.

The first is how they will differentiate,beyond hardware design, on top of the Windows Phone platform. I’ve said this before and I’ll say it again- selling a standard OS only leads to the “sea of sameness” and overcoming that sea of sameness will be key for Nokia. I believe their penchant for design is a good start. They are also bringing core apps with maps, music and sports to Windows Phone and that is a good start.

Second question is how successful will Nokia’s North America brand push be? Although here at Nokia World, Nokia did not release any specific data but they officially stated their commitment to the US market with a portfolio of products in the first half of 2012.

I believe there is still market share to be had with smart phones in the US and I feel RIM in particular is vulnerable there as well. In regard to Nokia in the US, if their efforts are successful,I believe it will affect Android devices more than the iPhone. So although Nokia is late to enter the US market, I hope they enter the US market strategically and relevantly and with a serious marketing budget as well. We will have to wait for further news before analyzing their North America efforts.

Overall, my take away from Nokia world is that Nokia is perhaps still highly relevant. In emerging markets they are designing devices with features consumers want, like dual SIMs, at price points they can afford. Their commitment to Windows Phone gives them a solid first step in smart phones and now executing in these areas above will be key.

The Big Questions for Nokia to Answer at Nokia World

Ever since Nokia made the decision to partner with Microsoft and standardize on Windows Phone software to drive Nokia hardware, I have become more optimistic on Nokia’s future.

Enough so that I felt compelled to attend Nokia World in London, which starts next week on the 26th. I am going there in the hopes to gain a better understanding of several key things from both Nokia and hopefully from Microsoft as well.

In my opinion Nokia needs to address three key things in order for me to believe they can be relevant in the worldwide smart phone market conversation.

The first thing I will be looking for is the quality in design of the their new hardware. In many countries smart phones are also status symbols, things people want to show off in public, like a fashion statement. Therefore, Nokia needs to release hardware that can become or be seen as an object of desire.

The second thing I will be looking at is how, if anything, they have differentiated the Nokia experience on top of Windows Phone. My biggest concern for Windows Phone going forward is that they create the “sea of sameness” where other than design all devices are the same.

Differentiation is absolutely essential in mature and maturing markets. Because of that, I am hoping that Microsoft is beginning to work on ways that they can help their partners differentiate and compete in more than just hardware.

The last thing I will be looking at is branding. A company’s brand has become extremely critical in so many countries with regards to consumer electronics. Nokia, especially in the US, has little to no consumer mind share. Yet on a global scale the Nokia brand is still strong.

InterBrand ranks them currently at number 14, however, they suffered a 15% decline since 2010.
Although the Nokia brand is strong, I would content, that it is not synonymous with innovation and forward thinking technology. These are key things as consumer look to make investments in these devices for the future.

It will be interesting to see how, if at all, Nokia addresses these topics at Nokia World next week. I am optimistic, but then again I am an eternal optimist.

Why Microsoft WILL Buy Nokia

In a recent post on Why Google had to buy Motorola, I pointed out that both Ben and I had predicted that this would happen because we were convinced that in order for a company to really be successful in tablets and smartphones they had to own the ecosystem of hardware, software and services.

Today’s announcement that Google would buy Motorola’s Mobility Solutions group underscores this thinking. As Google studied the ingredients of Apples success, it became obvious that Apple’s ownership of the OS and then its ability to fine-tune the hardware to deliver a seamless user experience was critical to consumer’s strong acceptance of the iPad and iPhone. Apple uses this ownership to drive amazing innovation.

This allows them to deliver the upcoming iCloud service so that it can synchronize content and data between all OS devices and utilizes the hardware in special ways. And it gives them a platform for future innovation. For example, what if the next version of the Nano has Bluetooth on it and can be used in a wristband/watch option. Since it is IOS based, it would have the new alert system that will be in IOS 5. That means that technically, if you get an alert on your iPhone in your pocket, that same alert shows up on your Nano watch. This is just one example of how Apple can continue to drive innovation at the hardware, software and services integration level. Knowing Apple I am sure they have dozens of these types of things in the works.

Google clearly went to school on this and while they claim that the patents were a key part of the reason they bought Motorola Mobility, the other reason is that they clearly know that by owning the hardware and software they can now drive the innovation of Android from both the hardware and software level and take more control of their future. And while they want others to keep licensing Android, they basically threw their partners under the bus in order to insure Androids long term success. I predict you will see Android defections or at the very least, companies hedging their bets by endorsing a third alternative by the end of Sept.

Now, don’t think that this same thinking has escaped Microsoft. They have to have come to the same conclusion. Microsoft clearly wants Windows Mobile Phone 7 to become a worldwide hit and at this moment, Nokia is just another distributor of Windows Phone 7 in the same way HTC and other are. But if they decide to keep this OS as a pure licensed property and trust the hardware partners to innovate on their own, that boat has sailed. They too will come to the conclusion that if they want Windows Mobile 7 to be the third major alternative to Apple’s IOS and Google’s Android, they will need to own the hardware as well as the software and services.

Of course, this goes completely against their 30 years of history of being a software licensing company. Actually, they have precedent in hardware with the XBOX. But the rules have changed when it comes to mobile and I believe that Google’s move to buy Motorola Mobility has now forced Microsoft’s hand.

I now believe that it is no longer a matter of “if” Microsoft will buy Nokia but instead a question of “when” they will do it to make sure that Windows Mobile 7 can compete against Apple and Google.

Good Advice to Tech Leaders

My Friend Louis Gray posted a great article a few weeks ago called “Tech Leaders Don’t Win By Saying They’ll Crush Somebody.” I have to say I can’t agree more and I encourage all tech leaders to read the article.

All though I understand that some of these executives logic may be PR related, at the same time more often than not those types of statements accomplish the exact opposite goals of their original intention.

Louis states in his article:

Look at who is on top today in whatever category makes sense for you. Social networking. Search. Mobile OS. Tablets. Storage systems. Operating systems. Printers. You name it. You would be hard-pressed to see those companies having talked big about taking down number one when they were on their pathway to success. They probably didn’t do it at all.

The primary point being that the best posture to take is to talk more about your own products than the products of competitors.