Microsoft’s Business Model Ménage à Trois

Ben Thompson of Stratechery wrote yet another brilliant article on Microsoft entitled: “It’s Time To Split Up Microsoft“. Highly recommended reading. I agree with Thompson in part, and I disagree with him in part. Let’s start with the parts where we agree.

1.0 Balmer

1.1 Innovation Inflation

The following is from Steve Ballmer’s 2004 memo “Our Path Forward:”

    “The key to our growth is innovation. Microsoft was built on innovation, has thrived on innovation, and its future depends on innovation. We are filing for over 2,000 patents a year for new technologies, and we see that number increasing. We lead in innovation in most areas where we compete, and where we do lag – like search and online music distribution – rest assured that the race to innovate has just begun and we will pull ahead. Our innovation pipeline is strong, and these innovations will lead to revenue growth from market expansion, share growth, new scenarios, value-add through services (alone and in partnership with network operators), and using software to open up new areas.” ~ Steve Ballmer, via Ben Thompson’s Article

Hmm. If you have to use the word innovation 7 times in the span of a mere 115 words, you probably don’t know what the word means. Dogs chase cars, but that doesn’t mean they know how to drive. And Microsoft can chase innovation all it wants, but that doesn’t mean they know how to innovate.

I suspect what Ballmer was actually talking about in his memo was iteration, not innovation. Iteration is highly valuable too, but it has nothing at all to do with innovation.

  1. Iteration is incremental improvements in an existing product or service.
  1. Innovation is unique, yes. And it is uniquely useful, yes. But its key characteristic is that it meets unanticipated, unexpected, or unarticulated needs.

The trouble with innovation is that truly innovative ideas often look like bad ideas at the time. That’s why they are innovative — until now, nobody ever figured out that they were good ideas. ~ Ben Horiwitz

Iteration is preserving the status quo by enhancing it. Innovation is radical. It’s revolutionary. It’s subversive. It doesn’t build upon the old market, it shatters the status quo and creates a new market to build upon.

Truth be told, Ballmer wanted nothing at all to do with innovation. When Ballmer wrote his memo in 2004, Microsoft was the undisputed king of the tech world. Innovation is a change agent and last thing Ballmer wanted was to change things. On the contrary, Ballmer wanted things to stay exactly the way they were.

1.2 Focus

    “Ballmer then listed (in his memo) 10 different areas of “focus”, the vast majority of which were themselves so broad as to be meaningless.” ~ Ben Thompson

I love the point Ben Thompson is making here. Focusing on ten things is the same as focusing on nothing. Yet Microsoft’s “focus” problem went even deeper than this. In a perverse way, Microsoft WAS very focused. Only they were focused on the wrong thing: their competitors. Jeff Bezos nicely sums up the problem with that approach:

If you’re competitor-focused, you have to wait until there is a competitor doing something. Being customer-focused allows you to be more pioneering. ~ Jeff Bezos

Does this sound like the Microsoft we all know and love? The Zune was a response to the iPod. Windows Phone 7 was a response to the iPhone. Surface was a response to the iPad. And all of those responses came to market late, late, late.

During Ballmer’s reign, Microsoft didn’t so much have a strategy as they had an anti-strategy. (See my article: Microsoft Is The Very Antithesis Of Strategy.) They waited for their competitors to act and then they reacted. They reacted far too slow and far too late. Even worse, they made bad choices, the worst of which was the choice to make their own hardware. The Zune flopped, the purchase of Nokia is a boondoggle and the Surface is a financial anchor weighing Microsoft down. Microsoft needs hardware like a fish needs a net.

1.3 Microsoft’s High-Water Mark

Ben Thompson:

    “Ballmer and Microsoft simply could not break free of their Windows-first mindset, and while it would be another 3 years before the iPhone arrived, it was this memo and what it represented that marked the beginning of Microsoft’s decline.”

A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses; it is an idea that possesses the mind. ~ Robert Oxton Bolt

[pullquote]Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you are a mile away from them and you have their shoes. ~ Dave Barry[/pullquote]

This is the point in my article where I’m supposed to trash Steve Ballmer for being shortsighted. But, truth be told, I have a lot of sympathy for him. The only thing harder than saving a dying company is saving one at the top of its game.

A company near death HAS to focus.

The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. ~ Henry Kissinger

A company near death HAS to be innovative.

Mortal danger is an effective antidote for fixed ideas. ~ Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

[pullquote]Until you walk a mile in another man’s moccasins you can’t imagine the smell. ~ Robert Byrne[/pullquote]

Microsoft’s problem was they didn’t have a problem. Without the impetus of bankruptcy or any credible threat, they had little reason to change. In fact, they had NO reason to change and EVERY reason to stay the same. However, as Carrie Fisher put it, “There is no point at which you can say: ‘Well, I’m successful now. I might as well take a nap.'”

If everything’s under control, you are going too slow. ~ Mario Andretti

If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously overlooked something. ~ Steven Wright

In this business, by the time you realize you’re in trouble, it’s too late to save yourself. Unless you’re running scared all the time, you’re gone. ~ Bill Gates

Broken nesting doll

1.4 Vertical Or Horizontal — Pick One, Not Both

Ben Thompson:

    “(T)ech companies ought to be either vertically/platform focused, with software and services that differentiate hardware (like Apple), or horizontally/service focused, with the goal of offering superior software and services on all devices (like Google and Facebook). To try and do both, as Ballmer explicitly did with his “Devices and Services” strategy, is to do neither well: differentiating your devices by definition means offering an inferior service on other platforms; offering superior services everywhere means commoditizing your own devices. “Devices and Services” was nonsense.”

I LOVE this.

Microsoft used to have a clear and simple business model. They made the operating system, they licensed the operating system to hardware manufacturers. The end.

Microsoft didn’t compete with their hardware manufacturers by selling hardware. They didn’t compete with their developers by selling software. ((There is one HUGE exception to this rule and that is Microsoft Office. Ben Thompson does a great job of explaining why this conflict worked and worked well — for a while — so I refer you to his article, “It’s Time To Split Up Microsoft“. I couldn’t have said it half as well.)) They competed with other operating systems and boy, did they ever compete. During the eighties, Microsoft squashed challenger after challenger and when the dust from the PC wars settled, the only rival operating system left standing was the Mac — and even it was on its metaphorical knees. ((STEVE WILDSTROM: “From the day that the IBM PC overtook the Apple ][, Microsoft software dominated the market. The Macintosh, introduced in 1984, never challenged MS-DOS or Windows for dominance.”

“Other rivals to Microsoft did indeed lose: Novell’s DR-DOS and IBM’s OS/2 operating systems disappeared, along with Netware, Novell’s once-dominant office networking system.”))

Today, of course, it’s a very different story. Microsoft still licenses its operating system to hardware manufacturers. But it also directly competes with those same hardware manufacturers by selling hardware of its own. And while Microsoft is currently making serious inroads into the business of providing internet services that run across all platforms, they continue to directly compete with the very same platforms that they are attempting to sell their services to.

No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. ~ New Testament, Matthew 6:24

It’s really, really tough to make a great product if you have to serve two masters. ~ Phil Libin, Evernote CEO

Two masters? Microsoft is trying to simultaneously serve THREE masters. Yikes!

Microsoft fits the definition of a business model ménage à trois: There are three of ’em, and they’re all trying to screw one another.

Russian Nesting (Matryoshka) Dolls

2.0 Nadella

2.1 Better Than Ballmer

Ben Thompson:

    “To understand why so many serious Microsoft observers were encouraged by Satya Nadella’s week-ago memo, “Bold Ambition and Our Core,” it’s useful to go back 10 years and read Steve Ballmer’s 2004 memo Our Path Forward.”

Hmm. Apparently “serious” Microsoft observers are more willing to overlook the serious problems with Nadella’s memo just because it’s better than Ballmer’s memo, while less serious Microsoft observers, like me, take those serious shortcomings more seriously.

A…speech should be like a lady’s dress—long enough to cover the subject and short enough to be interesting. ~ R. A. “RAB” Butler

[pullquote]He can compress the most words into the smallest idea of any man I ever met. ~ Abraham Lincoln[/pullquote]

Let’s set aside the fact that reading Nadella’s memo was like gargling with broken glass ((With apologies to Hugh Leonard)).

And let’s set aside the fact that what Nadella’s memo lacked in depth it made up for in length. ((With apologies to Chares de Montesquieu))

And let’s agree Nadella’s memo is better than Ballmer’s memo…so long as we also agree that still isn’t saying very much.

So what? At best that’s damning with faint praise. ((Damning with faint praise is an English idiom for words that effectively condemn by seeming to offer praise which is too moderate or marginal to be considered praise at all. In other words, this phrase identifies the act of expressing a compliment so feeble it amounts to no compliment at all, or even implies a kind of condemnation.)) Exactly what was it Nadella said in his memo that “serious” Microsoft observers could possibly have found even remotely encouraging?

2.2 Going Sideways

Ben Thompson:

    “In contrast to Ballmer’s anything-but-“focus,” Nadella was quite specific:”

      More recently, we have described ourselves as a “devices and services” company. While the devices and services description was helpful in starting our transformation, we now need to hone in on our unique strategy. ~ Satya Nadella

What a great start! (Well, technically, it’s not really a “start” since we’re already 558 words into Nadella’s memo. But let’s set that aside, for now.) This is great stuff. Nadella has tactfully repudiated his predecessor’s strategy without actually saying it in so many words. Further, he’s promising to hone in on Microsoft’s unique strategy. I’m all agog. Can’t wait to hear what’s coming next!

    “At our core, Microsoft is the productivity and platform company for the mobile-first and cloud-first world. We will reinvent productivity to empower every person and every organization on the planet to do more and achieve more.” ~ Satya Nadella

DISAPPOINTED!

Seriously? That’s Nadella’s idea of honing in on Microsoft’s unique strategy? Prepare thyself for a MASSIVE rant.

Microsoft is a “platform” company? That could mean a lot of things. Or anything. Or nothing. Microsoft is a “productivity” company? Whoop-de-doo. Who isn’t? Microsoft is “mobile-first and cloud-first?” Newsflash: They can’t both be “first.” Microsoft will “reinvent productivity?” No, it won’t. You can’t reinvent productivity anymore than you can manufacture new antiques. Microsoft will “empower….” Ugh. Enough said.

    We will…empower every organization on the planet to do more and achieve more. ~ Satya Nadella

Ben Thompson seems to put particular stock in this phrase. I’ll discuss its “horizontal” business model implications below. However, in terms of defining Microsoft’s mission, it’s a complete dud. Microsoft is going to empower people to “do more and achieve more?” Wow, thanks for narrowing it down. Helping people “do more and achieve more” is about as non-specific, over-generalized, feel-good-but-means-nothing, applies-to-practically-every-company-that-ever-existed as it gets. That’s not honing-in, that’s zoning-out.

2.3 Teasing Out A Tortured Message

Ben Thompson:

      “Nadella was clear that focusing on “every person” meant focusing on every device as well:

        [Microsoft’s productivity apps] will be built for other ecosystems so as people move from device to device, so will their content and the richness of their services – it’s one way we keep people, not devices, at the center.” ~ Satya Nadella

This is exactly right. Nadella is making a choice here: productivity as a single unifying principle and, by extension, services based on people, not differentiation based on devices. Moreover, it’s a far more difficult and brave choice – obvious though it may be – than outside observers could likely understand. It was only a little over a year ago Ballmer declared, “Nothing is more important at Microsoft than Windows.”

Last week, Nadella said “No.” ~ Ben Thompson

Let’s break that analysis down.

    “(I)t’s a far more difficult and brave choice – obvious though it may be – than outside observers could likely understand.”

First, I concede I am an “outside observer.” However, I’m not willing to cede the interpretation of Nadella’s words solely to Microsoft insiders.

    “Nadella is making a choice here: productivity as a single unifying principle…”

Second, I’m totally not buying this. “Productivity” is far too broad a term to constitute a “single unifying principle.” And as for it being a “choice,” what exactly is Nadella choosing between: Productive and non-productive?

    “(S)ervices based on people, not differentiation based on devices.”

Third, what I think you are saying is you think Nadella is saying Microsoft is moving toward services, and away from devices. (If that’s what Nadella actually meant to say, it would have been nice if he had actually said it.) Further, I think you are saying you think Nadella is saying Windows is no longer Microsoft’s be all and end all. And — despite the tortured path used to get us there — I kinda agree with that interpretation. Unfortunately, Nadella’s actions — and Ben Thompson’s own analysis — disagree.

2.4 Two Problems

How do I know Ben Thompson’s analysis doesn’t support the suggestion Microsoft is moving away from devices and toward services? Because he says so in his article when he discusses Windows, here ((BEN THOMPSON: “For all the talk of moving beyond Windows (and Windows Phone), I am deeply skeptical Microsoft can truly pursue its potential as a software and services company as long as Windows is around.”)) and when he discusses Nokia, here ((BEN THOMPSON: “The effects of (the Nokia) deal – and understanding why it was made – have convinced me that Microsoft cannot truly reach its potential as a services company as long as Windows and the entire devices business is in tow.”)) and here ((BEN THOMPSON: “When Nadella took over earlier this year Microsoft had not only missed the mobile boat, he was now saddled with a $7.2 billion dollar anchor and 34,000 new employees. That’s the thing about last week’s layoffs: even after shedding 18,000 employees Microsoft will still be about 16% bigger than they were before the acquisition, and still tightly bound to a devices group that is working at diametrically opposed goals from the software and services businesses that are Microsoft’s future.”)) and when he discusses devices, here. ((BEN THOMPSON: “I’m bothered by the phrase “We have a big opportunity.” For (COO Kevin) Turner, the opportunity is in growing that 14%. As quoted by Gregg Keizer: We want to go from 14% to 18%, from 18% to 25%, from 25% to 30%. That’s the beauty of this model … [the opportunity] is much bigger than anything we’ve had in the past.

Turner is still talking about devices, and it’s really too bad.”))

And how do I know Satya Nadella isn’t moving Microsoft from devices and to services? Because his actions speak far louder — and far clearer — than do his words.

We know what a person thinks not when he tells us what he thinks, but by his actions. ~ Isaac Bashevis Singer

I’ll agree Satya Nadella has said “yes” to services. But what has he said “no” to? The Windows operating system licensing business model and the hardware business model (Nokia phones and Surface Hybrid) and the services business model all continue to co-compete, one with the other. Nadella is doing what Ballmer always did. When faced with a choice, he has chosen not to choose. When faced with a decision between business models, he has decided not to decide.

Action expresses priorities. ~ Gandhi

Yes, action expresses priorities. And inaction obscures them.

It’s true services may gain primacy at Microsoft. However, so long as three business models remain — like nesting dolls, one within the other — Microsoft’s internal conflicts and external turmoil will continue, unabated.

Deciding what not to do is as important as deciding what to do. That’s true for companies, and it’s true for products. ~ Steve Jobs

Matryoshka doll

Conclusion

Okay, let’s agree Nadella isn’t the best communicator in the world. That’s too bad because words can make your heart soar…or they can make your head sore. ((Tip of the hat to Dr. Mardy and his aphorisms.)) However, words aren’t everything. When the Nokia phone line is cut; when the Surface hybrid is cut; then we won’t have to read Nadella’s memos to know where Microsoft is headed. Nadella’s actions will speak far louder than any words could.

A man is judged by his deeds, not by his words. ~ Russian Proverb

Until that day, Microsoft should be careful that they don’t become a joke:

A Jewish woman had two chickens. One got sick, so the woman made chicken soup out of the other one to help the sick one get well. ~ Henny Youngman

Microsoft is in danger of making chicken soup out of their healthy business divisions in order to sustain their ailing businesses. If they’re not very, very careful, they’ll end up with a bunch of dead chickens and egg all over their face.

Microsoft Is The Very Antithesis Of Strategy

Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art Of War

Microsoft could learn much from Sun Tzu. Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Microsoft has engaged in the very worst kind of generalship. Microsoft has allowed their competitors to join forces and successfully scheme against them. Microsoft has responded to the successes of their competitors by forswearing their strongest weapons, abandoning their strongest defensive positions and rushing to attack their competitors wherever they may be, even if those battlefields were located where Microsoft was at its weakest and their competitors were are at their strongest. When these attacks inevitably failed, Microsoft resorted to wars of attrition. Yet in these wars of attrition, it was Microsoft, not their opponents, who suffered most, taking disproportionally greater losses than they inflicted.

There are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested. ~ Sun Tzu

Microsoft’s approach is the very antithesis of a strategy. Here are five principles of war. See how Microsoft violates them over and over again.

Principle #1: Concentration

The principles of war, not merely one principle, can be condensed into a single word – ‘concentration’. But for truth this needs to be amplified as the ‘concentration of strength against weakness’. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart

Microsoft’s strategy over the past two decades has been the very opposite of concentration. Instead of acting, they react — lashing out in multiple, uncoordinated directions. A good strategy forces the opponent to compete on a battlefield where they have no chance of winning. Microsoft does the opposite. They pick fights they don’t need to fight, and they fight those battles on their opponent’s home turf, where their opponent is at their very best and Microsoft is at its very weakest.

Principle #2: Avoid Frontal Assaults

From the beginning of organized warfare, frontal attacks against prepared defenses have usually failed, a fact written large in military history for all generals to see. ~ Bevin Alexander, How Great Generals Win

The essence of strategy is to play to your strengths while taking advantage on your opponent’s weaknesses. Microsoft routinely flips this on its head, going out of its way to fight on battlefields of its opponent’s choosing — battlefields that emphasize the strengths of Microsoft’s opponent’s and minimize Microsoft’s own strengths.

It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art of War

In military terms, Microsoft does not just seek out the enemy — they look for them on the highest, most fortified hill, bristling with weapons — then they march straight at ’em.

To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:–this is the art of studying circumstances. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Contrary to the art of war, Microsoft just LOVES to make frontal assaults against the enemy while their banners are in perfect order.

The Spartans do not ask how many the enemies are but where they are. ~ Agis Ii, King Of Sparta

One may admire the bravado, the daring, and the courage of both the Spartans and Microsoft, but attacking the enemy where the enemy is strongest was not, is not and never will be sound strategy.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Example #1: iPod

In 2001, Apple introduced the iPod. By 2004, it was a smash success. Microsoft reacted, rather than acted. Instead of asking themselves WHY they needed to enter the MP3 market or even WHETHER they needed to enter the MP3 market, they attacked — first with their software licensed PlaysForSure, and later with their own Zune branded hardware.

From a strategic standpoint, Microsoft’s move to create the Zune was inane and bordering on the insane. Its strategy:

1) Obliged Microsoft to betray its existing allies (hardware manufacturing partners);
2) Required Microsoft to abandon its greatest and most powerful weapon (licensing software to hardware manufacturers);
3) Compelled Microsoft to fight with unfamiliar weapons (hardware);
4) Forced Microsoft to fight on the battlefield of its opponent’s choosing and where its opponent could could leverage its strongest assets (integrated software and hardware).

Therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. – Sun Tzu

It’s the equivalent of a lion — the king of his domain — abandoning the land in order to fight a shark at sea. What madness! It was a strategy that favored Apple and handicapped Microsoft in every meaningful way. It was, in fact, not a strategy at all but the abandonment of strategy. Instead of pitting their strength against their opponent’s weakness, Microsoft pitted their weakness against Apple’s strength. Microsoft’s defeat was virtually guaranteed.

Example #2: Bing

Google was founded in 1998 and soon became a very real threat to Microsoft. A response by Microsoft was appropriate and called for…but not the response Microsoft made. As usual, Microsoft went right at ’em by challenging Google where Google was strongest and where Microsoft was nonexistent — in search.

Let’s examine this from a strategic perspective:

  1. Attack opponent where opponent is strongest. Check.
  2. Attack opponent with a weapon with which you have little or no expertise (search engine/machine language). ((Of course, Microsoft has plenty of experience and expertise in search now, but at a tremendous price in both money and in time. Lost money, Microsoft can afford. Lost time, not so much.)) Check.
  3. Attack opponent where they live, thus guaranteeing that they will they will be inspired to fight with desperation in order to ensure their very survival. Check.
  4. Attack where even success gains you little or nothing. Check.

Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard – whilst he is well placed to parry or evade it. The experience of history shows that, save against a much inferior opponent, no effective stroke is possible until his power of resistance or evasion is paralysed. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy

Unsurprisingly, Microsoft’s search engine efforts haven’t significantly hurt Google. Worse still, they’ve actually HELPED Google. When Microsoft pitted Bing against Google Search, they created a legitimate, albeit ineffective, competitor. And that, in turn, meant Google was not a monopoly in search and not subject to government anti-trust and anti-monopoly oversight.

As when snow is squeezed into a snowball, direct pressure has always the tendency to harden and consolidate the resistance of an opponent, and the more compact it becomes the more difficult it is to melt. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart

I will readily concede that Bing has served, and continues to serve, Microsoft well on the back end. But on the back end is where it should have remained. By attacking Google directly where Google was strongest, Microsoft has lost billions upon billions of dollars and the result has been to make Google Search more, not less, secure.

Summary

Great generals know a direct attack, on the other hand, consolidates an enemy’s defenses and, even if he is defeated, merely forces him back on his reserves and his supplies. ~ Bevin Alexander, How Great Generals Win

Over the past 20 years, Microsoft’s only stratagem has been to directly assault their competitors where their competitors are strongest. This bull-headed non-strategy was formed in the late nineties when Microsoft truly did have overwhelming superiority. Back then, what Microsoft wanted, Microsoft took.

It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art of War

It’s not the late nineties anymore and Microsoft no longer outnumbers their competitors ten to one — or outnumbers them at all — but they still act as if they do. When one is outnumbered, one should flee, not fight. It may not sound like the noble thing to do, but it’s very sound strategy.

STRATEGY Definition on Blackboard (business marketing planning)

Principle #3: Never Reinforce Failure

A general must never reinforce failure. ~ Clausewitz ((Excerpt From: Charles River Editors. “The Top 5 Greatest Generals: Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon Bonaparte.”))

One of the myths that surrounds Microsoft is they “get it right on the third try”. I heard a pundit say this just last week in regard to the Microsoft Surface.

Really?

When was the last time Microsoft “got it right” on the third iteration? Or any subsequent iteration? The last time I recall Microsoft out-iterating an opponent was with Netscape, which was some 15 years ago. Or perhaps one could be thinking of the Xbox ((I would argue Xbox is a tactical master stroke but a strategic blunder — but that is an argument for another day.)) where Microsoft went five billion dollars in the red before even starting to make a return. However, those long ago victories can provide Microsoft with little solace today. Microsoft is no longer the 900-pound guerrilla it was a decade ago. And I think it is fair to say Apple is no Netscape and Google is no Sony PlayStation 2.

Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy

With products like Windows Phone 7 (now 8), Surface, and Windows 8, Microsoft is not iterating faster and catching up to their opponents. Far from it. They’re falling farther and farther behind. And it doesn’t matter anyway because the race they’r running in is already over.

Once a problem is solved, you compete by rethinking the problem, not making a slightly better version of the current solution. ~ Benedict Evans (@BenedictEvans)

Windows Phone 8 is an attempt to solve a problem that has already been solved by Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android. Surface is an attempt to pretend Apple didn’t solve the tablet problem when they introduced the iPad. Windows 8 is an attempt to ignore their decade-long failure to transplant a desktop operating user interface onto a tablet form factor.

Great generals do not repeat what has failed before. ~ Bevin Alexander, How Great Generals Win

Microsoft is not re-thinking the problem. They are simply failing at the same thing, in the same way, over and over again.

Principle #4: Avoid Sieges

The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art Of War

Microsoft simply does not quit. When they fail to win in the open field, they settle in for a long, drawn out siege. Yet when has this strategy ever worked for Microsoft? When, in recent history, has Microsoft ever overcome simply by carrying on?

These sieges have only led to Microsoft growing progressively weaker while their competitors grow ever stronger. It’s the exact opposite effect that the strategy is supposed to accomplish.

You may admire Microsoft’s doggedness — I do — and you may admire their perseverance — I do — but you simply cannot admire their strategy. Persistence is one thing. Pigheaded stubbornness is another thing altogether.

Attrition is a two-edged weapon and, even when skillfully wielded, puts a strain on the users. ~ B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy

Attrition is a long, slow, arduous and costly grind. It should only be used as a last resort. And its use makes no sense at all when it costs the aggressor more than it costs the besieged. That way lies only exhaustion, collapse and defeat.

To adopt the method of attrition is not only a confession of stupidity, but a waste of strength, endangering both the chances during the combat and the profit of victory. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart

Principle #5: Keep Your Object Always In Mind

Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances. Realize that there are more ways than one of gaining an object, but take heed that every objective should bear on the object. And in considering possible objectives weigh their possibility of attainment with their service to the object if attained – to wander down a sidetrack is bad, but to reach a dead end is worse. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy

Microsoft should take the above paragraph and pin it to every door, in every office in Redmond…

…except first, of course, they should identify what their object is.

Microsoft Has No Vision, No Mission, No Object To Guide Them

Everything wrong with Microsoft’s strategy comes down to this:

[pullquote]A person who aims at nothing is sure to hit it.[/pullquote]

Microsoft doesn’t know what their objective is.

Without that compass, without that “north star” to guide them, Microsoft is like a rudderless ship, subject to the pull and sway of every wind and every current.

Manage The Top Line

Somebody once told me, “Manage the top line, and the bottom line will follow.” What’s the top line? It’s things like, why are we doing this in the first place? What’s our strategy? What are customers saying? How responsive are we? Do we have the best products and the best people? Those are the kind of questions you have to focus on. ~ Steve Jobs

Does Microsoft ask itself such questions? If so, their actions certainly don’t reflect it.

In fact, I double-dog dare you to articulate Microsoft’s vision or its mission. The following is the best I could discover. I like the passion expressed, but I assure you, it’s not nearly specific enough to act as the guidance Microsoft so desperately needs:

We are obsessed with empowering people to do more and be more. ~ @Satyanadella (5/20/14)

Microsoft Needs To Re-Define Itself

— Microsoft has forgotten what they are good at.
— Microsoft has forgotten what business they are in.
— Microsoft has forgotten who they are.

In Nadella, Microsoft has a new CEO whom I admire. However, if he has a new vision for Microsoft, he has not yet clearly articulated it — and he needs to do just that.

Whenever anything is being accomplished, it is being done, I have learned, by a monomaniac with a mission. ~ Peter Drucker

Microsoft must redefine itself — must reset their vision. And then then need to shout that vision from the rooftops.

The very essence of leadership is you have to have a vision. It’s got to be a vision you articulate clearly and forcefully on every occasion.  You can’t blow an uncertain trumpet. ~ Theodore Hesburgh

Conclusion

Dead battles, like dead generals, hold the military mind in their dead grip…. ~ Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August

Past triumphs and past glories seem to hold Microsoft in their dead grip too. Microsoft is still fighting yesterday’s wars with yesterday’s no-longer-existing weapons. They need to acknowledge reality as it is and change their strategy accordingly.

The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out. ~ B. H. Liddell Hart

In my Insider’s article (subscription required) , I’ll talk about the strategy that Microsoft could — but almost certainly will not — follow.

Career Decision